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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.PRIORITIZING ECONOMIC GROWTH:
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Abstract
This paper spells out a logic for increasing macroeconomic policy space in order to prioritize
the goals of growth, employment creation and poverty reduction.
First, there is the need to create additional policy instruments so that a greater number of
policy goals can be addressed. Frequently, real economy goals get partly crowded out by financial
objectives because there are too few instruments for too many goals. Second, the calibrated use
of policy tools by degrees of commitment, deployment and assignment can create space for
different policy-mixes. Selective capital controls, intermediate exchange rate regimes, and some
monetary policy autonomy create the policy space within which a variety of policy combinations
and mixes are possible and a greater number of instruments are available. Prioritization of real
economy goals becomes both more feasible and more likely with a broader range of policy
alternatives. Third, along with selective use of capital controls, fiscal policy-based stabilization
instead of exchange rate-based stabilization delinks the exchange rate from the goal of internal
financial stability to which it is yoked in a regime of fixed exchange rates. This delinkage enables
the use of intermediate exchange rate regimes (soft pegs and managed floating). The use of
these regimes in ￿the missing middle￿ between fixed and flexible exchange rates creates policy
space where different mixes are possible generating a greater range of policy alternatives. Fourth,
prioritizing real economy goals is also facilitated by the design of a larger strategic framework
for accelerated development including institutions, norms, behaviours and governance. The larger
strategic framework mobilizes more assets and power toward a dynamic growth trajectory that
creates a more favourable context for macroeconomic policy. The impact of macroeconomic
policies on growth, employment creation and poverty reduction is likely to be stronger when
they are part of a wider effort to marshal resources for accelerated development. The examples
of the East Asian success stories provide the evidence for this conclusion.
These four steps in the logic for increased macroeconomic policy choice ￿ new policy tools,
selective and pragmatic use of capital controls and exchange rate intervention, fiscal policy-
based stabilization, and strategic frameworks ￿ reinforce each other in their capacity to create
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oping countries has led many to conclude either that
there is no ￿policy space￿ for economic policy al-
ternatives and/or that mainstream economic policy
practice is highly deflationary. The lack of choice
would seem to weaken democratic process in devel-
oping countries limiting the role of public discussion,
debate and decision in economic policy-making. And
the perceived priority of financial stability over real
economy objectives of economic growth and greater
employment feed a sense that there are biases in the
globalization process and in the international finan-
cial institutions which appear to preside over it. As
a result, there are strong motivations for exploring
the degree of macroeconomic policy choice, both
from internal political and economic perspectives and
from the point of view of the international debate.
This paper attempts to lay out a logic for the
notion that macroeconomic policy can indeed play
a role in stimulating economic growth and employ-
ment, despite the many realistic constraints on its
conduct. The soundness of the argument is impor-
tant to the international economic agenda and the
mechanisms for global governance, for if there is
indeed no room for macroeconomic policy choice,
then there is less reason to strengthen the ￿voice￿ of
developing countries in the global governance. If
￿one size fits all￿, then the boundaries on both de-
bate and decision are tightly drawn undermining the
need to hear and accommodate differing perspec-
tives on macropolicy in the international community.
However, recent experience also suggests that
financial stability is not sustainable without social
improvement, and that poverty reduction and en-
hanced equity are not sustainable without financial
stability. Today, the IMF and the Lula administra-
tion in Brazil both seem to recognize these inter-
connected policy imperatives and to be locked in a
dance together in which the fate of each depends on
the other. As a consequence, being able to prioritize
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... while the new policy direction has successfully uprooted the previous regime it has failed to
establish a flourishing alternative. More worrying still, in terms of future prospects, has been
the loss of policy autonomy, at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, and the
narrowing of the room for policy manoeuvre. Rubens Ricupero, Secretary General of UNCTAD
(UNCTAD, 2003: XII)
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growth, employment, poverty reduction and equity
are critical for the sustainability of policy reform
efforts. Without a sense of policy options, national
governments may be less inclined to participate in
global integration and governance. The presidents
of Argentina and Brazil met in the fall of 2003 and
signed a ￿sweeping statement, dubbed the Buenos
Aires Consensus, as a rejoinder to the Washington
Consensus￿The statement promised to generate
jobs, not just profit, and fight for fair, not just free,
global trade￿ (Smith, 2003).
This paper deals with policy alternatives, policy
constraints and policy experiences. The first three
sections develop the logic for enhanced policy space
developed from the analytics of the assignment of
instruments to objectives within open and closed
economies and under fixed and flexible exchange
rate regimes. The second set of three sections ad-
dresses the pressure of markets on policy practice,
especially fiscal policy, and the degree to which there
is policy space in the exchange rate policy debate
and experience. The last two sections give an over-
view of recent policy experiences in both Latin
America and East Asia in revealing limitations and
opportunities for exercising macropolicy choice.
I. Policy objectives and policy
instruments
Tinbergen taught us that for economic policy
to work, there needs to be at least as many policy
instruments as there are policy goals (Tinbergen,
1956). This principle, as we shall see, is difficult to
implement in a world of multiple objectives and
imposing constraints. Mundell helped carry this prin-
ciple forward in the early 1960s when he articulated
the idea of ￿assigning￿ each instrument of macroeco-
nomic policy to different policy objectives in an
effort to achieve internal and external balance at
the same time, something that was at the time be-
coming increasingly important due to the growing
openness of national economies to the world economy
(Mundell, 1962: 70￿77). As William Branson ob-
served many years later, the Mundellian framework
normally assigned fiscal policy to internal balance,
by which was meant the reduction of inflation, while
exchange rate policy was assigned to the trade bal-
ance or the current account, and monetary policy
was assigned to foreign exchange reserves or the
capital account (Branson, 1995: 116).
This is at once an ingenious and problematic
framework for it reveals even today the underlying
policy tensions at work which are driving both dis-
couragement about policy space and debate about
future policies. The deflationary bias implicit in this
assignment is clear. Contractionary fiscal policy is
necessary to bring down aggregate demand driven
inflation. Contractionary monetary policy is neces-
sary to keep the domestic interest rate higher than
the world interest rate to attract foreign capital. And
exchange rate devaluations, which restrict imports
even though exports expand, are necessary to shrink
the trade deficit.
While these policies are effective means of
achieving financial stability, the entire set of
macropolicy tools are essentially used up to avoid
excessive inflation and external imbalances leaving
no tool remaining to assign to economic growth and
employment generation. There are essentially too
few instruments to achieve financial stability and eco-
nomic growth at the same time. The 3x3 tool-target
matrix leaves out the real economy goals of economic
growth and employment generation (chart 1). This
conundrum creates incentives for thinking about how
to increase the number of policy instruments so that
real economy objectives (growth and jobs) can be
prioritized within the standard policy framework
formulated by Mundell. It also reveals the need to
think creatively about how to manage economic
policy trade-offs to preserve manoeuvring room for
policy makers so they in fact have options and
choices. Preserving policy space seems all the more
difficult against the background of recent policy
experiences in several high visibility cases of eco-
nomic policy crises in which there has been intense
pressure to give up policy instruments, reducing the
total number of instruments available rather than
increasing them, making the challenge of address-
ing real economy goals even more difficult.
II. Closed versus open economies
One way to get a grip on why the current policy
conundrum is so vexing, is to think about the
Mundellian policy framework in closed economies.
In closed economies, there are essentially only two
macropolicy instruments, fiscal and monetary policy.
But there are only internal policy goals, since exter-
nal targets are proportionately less important in
closed economies. Despite the presence of only two3 Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing Macroeconomic Policy Choice
instruments, the absence of two goals for external
balance means that there can be an internal pri-
oritization of employment generation through eco-
nomic growth as well as a goal for financial stabili-
zation through reducing inflation. In this world of
two tools for two domestic targets, fiscal policy could
be assigned in a Keynesian way to employment and
growth, while monetary policy could be assigned to
price stability. In a closed economy, the exchange
rate is not important in determining domestic eco-
nomic conditions because exports are a small share
of GDP. And, also, the tight linkage in open econo-
mies between interest rates and the exchange rate is
not as rigid in relatively closed economies.
In open economies with flexible exchange rate
regimes, expansionary monetary policy leads to in-
terest rate declines, in which case the exchange rate
must rise (depreciate) to off-set the decreased returns
in the domestic market caused by looser monetary
policy. Conversely, with contractionary monetary
policy in open economies, higher interest rates result
inexorably in a lower exchange rate (appreciation)
to equalize returns in all markets in a world of inte-
grated capital markets and open capital accounts. In
open as opposed to closed economies, the exchange
rate is the shock absorber and adjustment mecha-
nism that restores equilibrium when there has been
a policy shift internally or a policy shock externally.
This is one advantage of floating exchange rate re-
gimes.
Open economies, nonetheless, face a more dif-
ficult set of policy options than closed economies
both because of the addition of the two external goals
of current and capital account balance, and also pre-
cisely because in open economies with floating
exchange rates, the interest rate and the exchange
rate are rigidly linked to each other so that a vari-
ance in one forces an off-setting variation in the
other.1 These two facts together mean that it is very
difficult if not impossible to assign monetary policy
to an internal goal, whether price stability or em-
ployment, because the rigid link to the exchange rate
requires that monetary policy be assigned to exter-
nal balance. Now, these facts push macropolicy back
to the situation of too few instruments for too many
goals. In this situation common to open economies,
the real economy goals of employment and growth
tend to get sacrificed to the financial goals of defla-
tion and correction in the balance of payments which
generally are more immediate and more pressing.
External crises, depleting foreign exchange reserves,
take precedence over any other priority.
III. Floating versus fixed exchange
rate regimes
There are basically four types of exchange
rate regimes: floating, fixed, pegged and managed-
intervention regimes. Floating exchange rates are
market determined. They have the advantage of be-
ing very adaptive to changes in internal and external
circumstances and the disadvantage of leading to po-
tentially volatile exchange rates. Fixed rate regimes,
such as currency boards, are usually agreed to for
extended periods thereby having the advantage of
exchange rate stability which can play a major role in
achieving price stability but the disadvantage of sur-
rendering monetary policy autonomy. A pegged
Chart 1
ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY TOOLS TO
POLICY GOALS UNDER FLOATING
EXCHANGE RATE(*) AND FIXED
EXCHANGE RATE (#) REGIMES
Current Capital
Price account account Economic
stability balance balance growth
Fiscal policy * # --------or -------- #
Exchange rate # #    * #
Capital controls
Monetary policy *
Note: In floating rate regimes, the capital account is
assumed to be fully open, i.e. monetary policy has to
be assigned to the capital account. Thus, the three
macropolicy tools are assigned to three targets, which
means that growth is in effect crowded out.
In fixed exchange rate regimes, monetary policy
autonomy is foregone and the capital account is
assumed to be fully open removing capital controls as
an instrument of macropolicy. In the trade-off between
assignment to the current account and economic
growth, fiscal policy tends to be assigned to external
balance rather than internal growth. The exchange rate
becomes an anchor for achieving internal price
stability with spillover effects on external balance.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 37
exchange rate regime is one in which the govern-
ment establishes the exchange rate as a matter of
policy and the central bank intervenes in foreign
exchange markets buying and selling foreign
exchange to support the ￿peg￿ until the govern-
ment shifts policy when it designates a new rate. A
managed-intervention regime usually means the
establishment of a ￿soft￿ peg or dirty float, including
an exchange rate band (say, plus or minus 2.5 per
cent above and below a designated rate which may
or may not be announced) which the central bank
sustains by selective intervention in exchange and
money markets.
The essential issue for the discussion here is
that the type of exchange rate regime chosen has
significant implications for the degree of macropolicy
discretion open to governments. For example, in a
pegged exchange rate regime, the exchange rate be-
comes a policy instrument whereas in a floating rate
regime the exchange rate often becomes a policy
target which requires that monetary or fiscal policy
or both discipline themselves in order to sustain the
floating rate at some reasonable level. It is the case
(though it will not be demonstrated here) that only
monetary policy is effective in floating rate regimes
in stimulating growth in GDP. Fiscal policy for
growth in floating rate regimes induces higher in-
terest rates and exchange rate appreciation which
nullify the growth stimulus from expansionary fis-
cal policy.
As a result, the policy problem in floating rate
regimes is that monetary policy would have to do
double-duty on both the internal and external fronts
if growth were to be a priority. If fiscal policy is
assigned to inflation, the exchange rate to the cur-
rent account and monetary policy to the capital
account and the exchange rate, monetary policy can
not be assigned to internal real economy objectives.
This is in effect a 3x4 tool-target situation in which
the conundrum of too few instruments for too many
goals reappears in which growth is crowded out (con-
figuration * in chart 1). Even though in floating rate
regimes monetary policy ￿works￿ to improve con-
ditions in the real economy by stimulating economic
growth, it is pre-empted from doing so by the rigid
linkage between interest rates and exchange rates
and the primacy of the exchange rate stability over
income growth. If the exchange rate weakens, inter-
est rates must rise to appreciate the exchange rate
before any other consideration. If monetary policy
is assigned to both internal growth and external sta-
bility, then growth would require expansionary
monetary policy while external stability would
require contractionary monetary policy. Balance of
payments and exchange rate concerns generally pre-
dominate over economic growth considerations in
these circumstances, so the goal of growth gets sac-
rificed.
In a fixed exchange rate regime for the long-run,
market pressures that generate nominal exchange rate
equilibrium points above or below the fixed nomi-
nal rate must be responded to by the central bank. If
the expectations of currency holders shift toward a
de facto depreciated level for the exchange rate, the
central bank would have to sell dollars to take local
currency out of circulation to restore the market-
determined nominal rate to the fixed nominal rate.
This reduction in the money supply causes interest
rates to rise leading to declines in output or income
from what they would have been under a floating
rate regime. The force field affecting macropolicy
under a fixed rate regime dampens the rate of eco-
nomic growth and restricts the capability of monetary
policy to stimulate growth. This is the cost in real
economy terms for the financial stability achieved
both in the exchange rate and in the price level.
Monetary policy autonomy is lost and the priority
of real economy objectives are made secondary to
financial objectives because of the deflationary pres-
sure on monetary policy of a fixed exchange rate
regime.
However, it is also the case (though it will not
be demonstrated here) that only fiscal policy is ef-
fective in stimulating growth in output and incomes
(GDP) under fixed exchange rate regimes even
though fiscal policy is not effective in flexible, mar-
ket-determined exchange rate regimes. In principle,
it should be possible to stimulate economic growth
with fiscal policy in a fixed rate regime. The now-
familiar conundrum of too few instruments for too
many goals reappears. Since exchange rate policy is
locked to price stability as an exchange rate anchor
in a fixed rate regime and monetary policy autonomy
is lost as a consequence, fiscal policy is the only
macropolicy instrument left. Policy makers are
forced to choose between assigning fiscal policy to
the internal goal of growth or to the goal of external
balance (configuration # in chart 1). External stabil-
ity in the short-run, both exchange rate stability and
balance-of-payments financing, normally pre-empts
the long-run growth trajectory of the economy. This
forces policy makers to contract fiscal policy to5 Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing Macroeconomic Policy Choice
achieve external balance rather than stimulate the
economy to achieve growth in incomes and jobs.
Therefore, under both flexible and fixed rate
regimes there are forces pushing macropolicy toward
a deflationary impact on the economy for the sake
of financial stability rather than toward stimulating
economic growth for the sake of social stability. In
the current circumstances and after recent experi-
ences in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in the
1990s, this is an unacceptable set of policy choices
for most governments in developing countries, es-
pecially for those that are democratically elected.
This leads to a search for enhancing the space for
macropolicy choice, especially for developing coun-
tries with enormous numbers of people in poverty
left behind by insufficient and unsustained rates of
economic growth.
IV. Selective pragmatism
Markets are extraordinarily powerful mecha-
nisms. No set of people knows this better than those
who are or have been ministers of finance or central
bank presidents. If market forces are pushing major
macropolicy variables like the real exchange rate or
the real interest rate away from their nominal values
and governments are trying to force equilibrium or
maintain divergence against the grain of the market,
there is a limit to how long the government policy
can prevail over markets. This is not an ideological
statement based on value preferences. It is a fact of
economic life that determines the range within which
reasonable, effective economic policy can be forged.
Wishful thinking does not work. Only policies that
are within a set of boundaries that are realistic in
terms of market pressures are feasible policies. The
search for larger policy space for macropolicy
choices has to be driven by rational pragmatism
based on realities rather than by idealism based on
hope or ideology based on hidden political agendas.
A useful framework for thinking about policy
options in this context is the trilemma. The trilemma
posits three desirable policy positions known as ￿the
impossible trinity￿ and the trade-offs between them.
All countries, undoubtedly, wish to have a stable
exchange rate, an open capital account, and autono-
mous monetary policy. The trilemma helps make
clear that these three desiderata are actually trade-
offs. Policy makers are forced to be on one of the
three sides of the triangle on a line embracing only
two of the three desiderata and foregoing the third
(see chart 2). From the above analysis of fixed and
flexible exchange rate regimes, it is clear that a cur-
rency board can achieve a stable exchange rate with
an open capital account but only at the expense of
an autonomous monetary policy. A floating rate re-
gime can restore monetary policy autonomy with an
open capital account at the cost of some potential
exchange rate volatility. Similarly, implementing
capital controls can also restore monetary policy
autonomy with exchange rate stability but at the cost
of free capital movements.
Whereas the trilemma shows that there is a need
to choose which of the two desiderata are preferred, it
is also the case that there is not a requirement to go to
what John Williamson has called ￿the corner solutions￿
(Williamson, 2000). It is possible to engage in selec-
tive capital controls and a managed-intervention
exchange rate regime which reclaims some monetary
policy autonomy. These moves away from the cor-
ners create more policy space within the original
triangle of the trilemma (above) bounded by the more
extreme positions of fixed exchange rate, entirely open
capital account and fully autonomous monetary policy.2
This policy space creates two opportunities to
enhance the range of macropolicy choice. One is to
provide opportunities for different mixes of policy
instruments in which the degrees of deployment of
each policy tool can be calibrated to fit specific cir-
cumstances. This is a significant difference from a
policy setting of either-or choices and corner solu-
tions. Second, this enhanced policy space allows
countries to have four macropolicy instruments ￿
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies and par-
tial capital controls ￿ which permit the country to
pursue four policy goals: price stability, current and
capital account balance, and growth.
This innovation in policy stances is feasible
because moving toward the pragmatic middle3 in-
stead of the extreme ￿corners￿ enlarges the number
of goals it is feasible to pursue due to enlarging the
number of instruments that are available. Capital
controls and exchange rates cease to be ￿corner so-
lutions￿ and can be ￿assigned￿ to specific goals,
increasing the number of policy tools to match the
number of policy goals.
Therefore, there are three major steps that
achieve enhanced policy space: the idea of fiscal6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 37
policy-based stabilization replacing exchange rate
anchors; intermediate exchange rate regimes replac-
ing the extremes of fixed versus floats; and selective
capital controls replacing the false dichotomy of
fully open versus fully controlled capital accounts.
V. Fiscal policy-based stabilization
One of the reasons why countries have been
backed into the corners of the trilemma is that they
themselves have failed to sufficiently discipline fis-
cal policy, and to a lesser extent monetary policy, to
sustain a stable economy and exchange rate. The
classic case is Argentina which for decades could
not as a nation maintain fiscal discipline which
spilled over into rapid inflation, balance-of-payments
crises, external debt excesses, and political upheav-
als. Finally, in the early 1990s, an innovative finance
minister, Domingo Cavallo, turned the economy on
its head by getting Congress to pass a Constitutional
amendment establishing a currency board of one Ar-
gentine peso equal to one dollar (Corrales, 1997; and
Dominguez, 1997). This policy move effectively
￿assigned￿ the exchange rate to internal price sta-
bility and used it as an anchor for domestic prices to
halt the momentum of hyperinflation. Monetary policy
autonomy was sacrificed to support the currency
board. Open capital accounts were maintained to
provide an avenue for financing current account defi-
cits. Only fiscal policy remained. In this context,
fiscal policy should have been assigned to external
balance since exchange rate policy had in effect taken
over from fiscal policy to achieve price stability.
But since fiscal policy ￿works￿ in fixed exchange
rate regimes, under the currency board fiscal policy
in Argentina was de facto available for double-duty as
an instrument for stimulating economic growth.
Given Argentina￿s anomalous relationship between
the central government￿s sole responsibility for rev-
enue raising and expenditure autonomy of state
governments, fiscal discipline was impossible to
maintain. Continuous fiscal deficits within a fixed
exchange rate regime eventually acts like steam in a
pressure cooker. The economic meltdown in Argen-
tina following the failure of the currency board was
Chart 2
TRILEMMA
Note: Extreme policy stances in the corners, such as completely open capital account, fully autonomous monetary policy or
fixed exchange rate regimes force policy choices on the lines connecting the corners of the triangle, meaning that one
of the three options is foregone.  Pragmatic policy stances of selective capital controls, some monetary policy autonomy
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one of the most devastating economic crises of mod-
ern times. One of the conclusions from this experience
has to be that fiscal discipline is a sine qua non for
economic policy regardless of whether the exchange
rate regime is fixed or flexible or a mix (Mussa,
2002: 6). This is an old lesson, articulated long ago
in the economic literature, but hard to implement in
the world of policy practice.
For the future, it seems essential to insist that
exchange rate stability and economic stabilization
more generally depend upon fiscal policy discipline
regardless of the type of exchange rate regime. It
would seem to be more effective to have fiscal-based
stabilization programmes than to use exchange rates
as anchors for achieving price stability. In the rear
view mirror, exchange rate-based stabilization pro-
grammes look like furtive attempts to escape the
fiscal policy straight jacket which, it now must
be realized, has to be worn whether it feels good or
not and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flex-
ible.
With this notion of fiscal policy-based stabili-
zation as a guide, fiscal policy can be assigned to
price stability with the important implication that
fiscal discipline will now be the primary foundation
for exchange rate stability. This occurs both directly
through controlling the price level and through con-
trolling the expected exchange rate. One could even
think of this assignment as fiscal policy-based ex-
change rate policy.4 The additional instrument of
capital controls is assigned to the capital account.
The exchange rate is assigned to the current account
instead of to price stability as under a currency board.
With this configuration, monetary policy is avail-
able to be used as an instrument for economic growth
and employment creation instead of being foregone
as a macropolicy tool.
This four-by-four policy (4x4) assignment
matrix in chart 3 is made possible by using fiscal
policy for internal stabilization instead of the ex-
change rate, by exploiting the fact that fiscal disci-
pline has important spillover effects on exchange rate
stability, and by avoiding the extremes of entirely
open capital accounts or fixed exchange rates. Se-
lective capital controls can be assigned to the capi-
tal account whereas fully open capital accounts
deprive policy makers from using capital controls
as a tool of macropolicy. The number of policy tools
is equal to the number of real and financial goals so
that economic growth can be prioritized (chart 3).
There are three ways, then, that these moves
provide more policy space for monetary policy, spe-
cifically. First, fiscal policy-based stabilization has
positive spillover effects on the exchange rate by
providing a credible foundation for its stability. There
is less need for high interest rates to strengthen an
exchange rate already perceived to be strong by
virtue of fiscal policy discipline under girding it. Sec-
ond, capital controls assigned to the capital account
allow the domestic interest rate to differ somewhat
from the world interest rate without such drastic
consequences as under the assumption of perfect
capital mobility and open capital accounts. Third,
selective exchange rate intervention loosens the au-
tomatic necessity of foreign exchange sales or
purchases required under fixed exchange rates with
direct consequences for the interest rate. Intermedi-
ate exchange rate regimes with fiscal policy-based
stabilization can rely on a stronger exchange rate
less affected by expansionary monetary policy than
would have been the case with both monetary and
fiscal policy assigned to growth, which could weaken
the credibility of the exchange rate over time threat-
ening its stability.
Chart 3
ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY TOOLS TO POLICY
GOALS UNDER INTERMEDIATE EXCHANGE
RATE REGIMES (X)
Current Capital
Price account account Economic





Note: In intermediate exchange rate regimes (soft pegs and
managed floating), the interest rate is delinked from
the exchange rate, freeing up monetary policy for
assignment to economic growth.  Selective capital
controls become the fourth policy instrument and are
assigned to the capital account.  Fiscal policy-based
stabilization becomes the foundation for internal
price and the exchange rate (+) stability, which gives
more room for monetary policy to stimulate growth.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 37
This set of goals and assignments contrasts with
the deflationary bias of floating rate regimes and with
the constraints imposed by fixed rate regimes which
leave fiscal policy bearing all the burden for inter-
nal and external balance. This combination of
selective pragmatism in exchange rate and capital
account management creates enough policy instru-
ments for the number of policy objectives and
provides the enhanced policy space essential for
prioritizing economic growth in national economic
policy. Fiscal policy-based stabilization frees up the
interest rate from its rigid link to the exchange rate
by directly and indirectly strengthening the real ex-
change rate. This configuration has the advantage
that monetary policy is an agile instrument for pro-
moting economic growth due to the fact that it can
be controlled more directly, immediately and flex-
ibly than fiscal policy.
A problem with policy assignment scenarios is
that spillover effects do, of course, occur. The ef-
fects of the use of the policy variable do not stay
contained within the cell of the matrix the assign-
ment designates, to be sure. The effects of fiscal
discipline does dampen growth which monetary
policy is trying to stimulate; monetary expansion
lowering interest rates does weaken the exchange
rate which tight fiscal policy is trying to strengthen.
The assignment is not univalent, only affecting the
desired outcome variable. This is a complication in
all economic policy. The challenge is to manage with
the policy space available the tensions and trade-
offs embedded in each specific context.
VI. The exchange rate debate and
policy space
The issue of policy space is tightly linked to
the debate surrounding exchange rate regimes on
which there is a variety of views. In back-to-back
articles from the American Economic Association
annual meeting in 2000, there are two diametrically
opposite prognostications. Chang and Velasco write:
￿The question for most emerging market economies
is no longer ￿To float or not to float?￿ but ￿How to
Float?￿￿ (Chang and Velasco, 2000: 71). By con-
trast Reinhart writes: ￿If ￿fear of floating￿ continues
to be the serious policy issue it has been in the past,
and if ... lack of credibility remains a serious obsta-
cle, then the only way to avoid the ￿floating and
credibility problems￿ simultaneously may be full
dollarization. A corner solution indeed!￿ (Reinhart,
2000: 70). A year later, Dornbusch wrote: ￿Five argu-
ments make up the case against currency-board
arrangement ... On the surface each argument is per-
suasive; on closer scrutiny none really is￿ (Dornbusch,
2001: 238￿239). Fischer concluded after a survey of
trends in exchange rate regimes in the 1990s, ￿there
is clearly a trend ... in the direction of hard pegged
exchange rate regimes￿ (Fischer, 2001: 18).
These representative articles give a flavour of
what Fischer called the ￿bipolar view￿ that the real
choices are between floating and fixed and that there
is what John Williamson has called ￿the missing
middle￿. If these views are correct, then the possi-
bility of moving toward selective intervention in
currency markets through ￿soft￿ pegged exchange
rates or dirty floats with off-setting monetary actions
would jeopardize the argument that policy space can
be realistically enhanced by implementing alterna-
tive intermediate exchange rate regimes between the
corners.
From the point of view of the line of reasoning
presented here, a managed float exchange rate re-
gime where there is central bank intervention in
money markets for exchange rate management pur-
poses constitutes a move away from the boundary
lines of the trilemma and a factor in enlarging the
policy space within the original triangle. Ninety one
countries or just under 50 per cent of the 185 countries
surveyed by Fischer (2001) at of the end of 1999 had
intermediate exchange rate regimes (managed floats
or soft pegs) while 19 per cent had hard pegs, 5 per
cent have joined currency unions (the EU) and 27 per
cent had independent float regimes (see table 1).5
As a consequence, there were nearly as many
countries at the end of 1999 that had intermediate
exchange rate regimes which would potentially en-
hance policy alternatives through enlarged macro-
policy space as there were countries with fixed or
floating rate regimes with reduced policy discretion.
As Frankel has put it recently, a more nuanced in-
terpretation of current policy dilemmas would be to
realize that the trilemma does not have to require
that ￿one give up both complete stability and com-
plete independence￿ and that it is possible to have
￿half-stability and half-independence in monetary
policy￿ (Frankel, 2003: 17, italics added). There is
room for policy choice when the purity of the corners
is abandoned and pragmatic policy decisions substi-
tute for options pushed by market fundamentalism.9 Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing Macroeconomic Policy Choice
VII.Selective use of capital controls
Another example of this pragmatic approach is
in the arena of capital controls. Given the number of
different types of capital transactions, there is no
particular reason beyond ideological ones why it
would necessarily behoove a country to adopt the
same policy for all types of capital transactions.
Rather, there are alternatives for differential treat-
ment for capital inflows as opposed to capital
outflows, for short-term versus long-term capital, for
portfolio flows vis-￿-vis direct foreign investment,
etc. The approach of selective intervention applied
to capital controls achieves a similar result as that of
selective intervention in foreign exchange markets
in moving policy decisions out of the corners of ex-
treme measures and off the boundary lines of the
trilemma triangle.
 The use of capital controls by national gov-
ernments is widespread. Until 1997 the IMF had only
one line for capital controls in its Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). In 1997 a new system was developed
which contained a dozen categories, increasing to
13 in 1998.6 From 1997 to 2003, the IMF published
summary tables showing the use by national govern-
ments of capital controls in each of these categories
for all members of the IMF (see summary in table 2).
The patterns are clear.7 First, a substantial
number of countries utilize a variety of capital con-
trols. In 1996 over 100 countries registered themselves
as using capital controls in seven of the 13 catego-
ries. Hence, capital controls were in wide use before
the Asia crisis. Second, there was a significant
increase in capital controls from 1996 to 1997, prin-
cipally in two categories: financial credits and
provisions specific to commercial banks and other
credit institutions. This reflects the immediate re-
sponse of countries during the Asia crisis. Looking
at the 1996￿2002 period as a whole after the Asia
crisis, there were two types of trends. First, by 2002
there was an increase in the use of capital controls
in additional categories, especially controls on per-
sonal capital movements and institutional investors.
Second, there was virtually no increase or a slight
decline in the use of capital controls in eight of the
13 categories between 1996 and 2002. These two
trends together show the selective targeted nature
of the use of capital controls in contrast to an across-
the-board approach in the wake of the Asia crisis.
Based on these patterns, it can be seen that there
is already widespread use of capital controls by na-
tional governments. By 2002, over 90 countries used
capital controls in each of 11 of the 13 categories.
Whereas there was a significant increase in use in
1997 during the Asia crisis, it was not an avalanche.
There was not a sea-change in the use of capital con-
trols in 1997￿1998 or beyond, for that matter. But
there has been a steady increase in the use of six
types of capital controls, including real estate and
guarantees, from 1996 through 2002. This suggest
greater eclecticism and pragmatism in economic
policy-making since the Asia crisis.
The other important trend is that whatever ten-
dency there was toward capital account liberalization
before the Asia crisis, it seems to have come to a
halt after it. Increased selective management of capi-
tal controls since 1996 seems to be an economic
policy reality, just as the increase in intermediate
exchange rate regimes in the 1990s has become evi-
dent as well. These two moves away from the
Table 1
TYPE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
APPLIED IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
OF COUNTRIES
Hard Inter-
peg mediate Floating Total
Developed countries 11 3 8 22
Emerging market
economies 3 17 13 33
All other countries 31 71 28 130
Total 45 91 49 185
Source: Fischer (2001), figures 1, 2 and 3; and tables 1, 2 and 3.
Note: There were 28 countries with managed float regimes
at the end of 1999, which together with 63 countries
with ￿intermediate￿ exchange rate regimes (￿soft￿
pegs of some sort) constitute a group of 91 countries
out of a total of 185 countries.  Within the framework
being developed in this paper, managed float regimes
are ￿intermediate￿ regimes rather than in the same
category as ￿independent float￿ regimes, as in
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extremes relieve the need to forego policy instruments
and options for the sake of corner solutions and help
create an expanded policy space in which policy
makers can prioritize economic growth and combine
policies to achieve multiple financial and real
economy policy objectives simultaneously.
The selective use of capital controls in large
emerging market economies is beneficial as a means
of dampening exchange rate volatility but at the same
time is hard to impose in a world of highly inte-
grated capital markets. Selective use of capital con-
trols may still be feasible in these large middle
income countries which now constitute important
players in the global economy providing that mon-
etary and fiscal policy discipline are sufficient to
persuade markets that they are on a sustainable policy
path. Selective capital controls and exchange rate
intervention are even more feasible in smaller mid-
dle and lower middle income countries where there
is less pressure from global financial markets than
is the case in large emerging market economies.
Table 2
USE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS: 1996￿2002
(Number of provisions)
Capital transactions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Controls on:
Capital market securities 128 127 133 125 128 131 128
Money market instruments 112 111 115 110 111 110 107
Collective investment securities 107 102 103 103 102 101 99
Derivatives and other instruments 78 82 87 83 84 83 83
Commercial credits 103 110 105 108 109 107 104
Financial credits 76 114 112 113 114 113 112
Guarantees, sureties and financial backup facilities 82 88 88 93 97 96 92
Direct investment 144 143 149 147 146 147 149
Liquidation of direct investment 54 54 52 54 57 59 57
Real estate transactions 119 128 134 136 138 135 137
Personal capital movements n.a. 64 82 90 93 91 97
Provisions specific to:
Commercial banks and other credit institutions 131 152 155 158 157 157 160
Institutional investors 60 68 82 83 84 86 91
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, annual issues,
1997 through 2003.  These reports are for the IMF financial year which ends on 30 April of the year of the Report.  This
is important since in 1997 countries reported before the Asia financial crisis that hit in mid-year.  Individual countries
report at different points in the year, but basically the Report reflects conditions in the previous calendar year.11 Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing Macroeconomic Policy Choice
VIII. From populism to orthodoxy to
heterodox policy packages
If it is the case, as is argued here, that conven-
tional economic wisdom tends to favour financial
stability before if not indeed over economic growth
and that there is a deflationary bias in conventional
economic policy thinking, then it is also the case
that efforts to reverse this prioritization and introduce
a pro-poor growth bias in macropolicy management
have sometimes erred in the opposite direction. In
fact, there has been a variety of experiments in re-
cent years some of which have come to be called
￿the macroeconomics of populism￿ (Dornbusch and
Edwards, eds., 1991). Others have had more ortho-
dox stabilization programmes while still others have
introduced novel measures of a heterodox nature. A
brief review of these experiences can provide the
basis for adding policy instruments to the 4x4 policy
matrix as another means of enhancing macroeconomic
policy space (Agenor and Montiel, 1996: 265￿297).
The two experiments in macroeconomic populism
often cited are the Allende regime in Chile from 1971
to 1973 and the Garcia Government in Peru from
1986 to 1990. In both cases, there were direct inter-
ventions to increase wages on the one hand and
control prices on the other with the hope that the real
wage for workers would increase squeezing profit
rates but increasing total profits. Interestingly, both
governments moved off managed exchange rate
regimes to fixed exchange rates as a means of con-
trolling inflation but also to keep external debt
payments a lower share of GDP. With budget defi-
cits increasing substantially in both countries,
inflation exploded undermining the exchange rate,
ultimately causing a haemorrhage in capital outflows
depleting foreign exchange reserves.
In Chile the fiscal deficit went from 3 per cent
of GDP in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1973, while in Peru
the public sector deficit went from 3 per cent in 1985
to 7.5 per cent in 1988. GDP growth surged in the
early years of both governments to 9 per cent in Chile
in 1971 and to 8.5 to 9 per cent in Peru in 1986￿1987
only to plummet in both countries to -5.6 per cent in
1973 in Chile and to -8 and -11 per cent in Peru in
1988 and 1989. Inflation in both countries soared
from 35 per cent per year in 1970￿1971 in Chile to
over 600 per cent in 1973 and from 63 per cent in
Peru in 1986 to over 2700 per cent in 1989 (Agenor
and Montiel, 1996: tables 8.2 and 8.3; and text pages
267￿270). Both efforts ended in collapse with
Allende being overthrown by Pinochet in 1973 and
Garcia loosing in an election to Fujimori in 1989.
The policy problem in these Governments was one
of essentially sacrificing the goals of internal price
stability and external balance for the goal of growth
only to have the financial disequilibrium generated
by this policy mix explode destroying the short-term
real economy gains. The forcing hand of external
imbalance manifested itself in these two populist
experiments undermining the internal agenda and the
government itself.
It appears to be that in cases of macroeconomic
populism ￿in the end, foreign exchange constraints
and extreme inflation forced a program of violent
real wage cuts that ended, in many instances, in
massive political instability, coups, and violence￿
(Dornbusch and Edwards, eds., 1991: 8). Neverthe-
less, it also appears to be the case that orthodox
stabilization programmes involving major macro-
policy adjustments end up restoring price stability
and the balance of payments at the expense of GDP
growth, real wage levels and employment. The cases
cited in Agenor and Montiel (1996) are Chile under
Pinochet from 1974 to 1977 and Bolivian reforms
in 1985. Fiscal adjustment was the centrepiece of
these two reform efforts. In Chile the fiscal deficit
declined from 25 per cent of GDP in 1973 to 2.6 per
cent in 1975. The exchange rate was assigned to the
current account rather than to price stability and was
devalued at a rate greater than the inflation rate which
improved the competitiveness of exports consider-
ably. But success on the current account was not
matched on the inflation front and furthermore GDP
shrank by 14 per cent and unemployment mush-
roomed to 17 per cent in 1975. In Bolivia, a similar
pattern emerged with draconian shifts from a fiscal
deficit of 30 per cent of GDP in 1984 to a surplus of
3 per cent in 1986 with greater success than Chile in
reducing inflation but with decidedly negative rates
of GDP growth (Agenor and Montiel, 1996: tables
8.4 and 8.5; and text pages 270￿275).
After a set of not overwhelmingly successful
exchange rate-based stabilization programmes in
Chile, Uruguay and Argentina initiated in 1978, it
was realized in the 1980s that in this sequence of
experiences in Latin America none were able to
achieve financial and real economy objectives si-
multaneously. As a result, a number of still more
innovative policy packages were undertaken in the
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(Agenor and Montiel, 1996: 282￿297). These het-
erodox approaches yielded up several additional
instruments of economic policy which help generate
a greater amount of flexibility and combinations
enhancing macropolicy choice.
For example, debt reschedulings in the 1980s
became an additional instrument for achieving capi-
tal account balance, while trade liberalization became
a tool for achieving improvements in the trade or
current account balance. Privatization of public en-
terprises became a way of temporarily improving
the public sector deficit and capital inflows at the
same time. The problem was that privatization was
not a continuous source of additional finance but a
temporary one. Wage and price controls (￿pactos￿)
were increasingly applied as a way of trying to in-
crease real wages while containing inflation. New
currencies were created as a way of gaining a fresh
start and innovative exchange rate management
modalities were experimented with as ways of steer-
ing between fixed and flexible exchange rates. The
new policy instruments ￿ wage and price controls,
trade liberalization and debt rescheduling ￿ can be
assigned within the traditional 3x3 matrix to the goals
of price stability, the current account and the capital
account, respectively (chart 4).
This new assignment frees up monetary and
fiscal policy to have greater room to promote growth,
employment and poverty reduction, while maintain-
ing sufficient discipline to further contribute to
containing inflation and to exchange rate stability,
against the background of a stable financial context
strengthened by these new measures. See 4x4 as-
signment matrix above. The prioritization of real
economy objectives is more feasible in contexts in
which policy instruments are being added to the mix
than in ones in which they are being foregone. And
the possibilities for coming up with a variety of pos-
sible policy packages to promote real economy goals
increase as the number of policy tools increases. As
a consequence, these heterodox policy experiments
and experiences have made important contributions
to enhancing the degree to which monetary and fis-
cal policy can be assigned to economic growth while
increasing policy flexibility and choice. Another
source of new policy perspectives has been the dy-
namic growth of the East Asian economies since the
1970s and their rapid recovery from the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in the late 1990s.
Chart 4
ILLUSTRATIVE ASSIGNMENT OF ￿NEW￿
POLICY TOOLS TO POLICY GOALS AS A
MEANS OF PRIORITIZING ECONOMIC
GROWTH AS A GOAL OF
MACROPOLICY
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Note: The choice of the exchange rate regime in this
scenario is delinked from the need for the exchange
rate to be assigned to price stability as an exchange
rate anchor, since it is assumed that monetary and
fiscal policy discipline are sufficient to contain
domestic inflation and undergird a stable exchange
rate, regardless of exchange rate regime choice. This
is a sine qua non of macropolicy.  This context
permits managed-float or soft-pegged type
￿intermediate￿ regimes to work to create more
macropolicy space for a greater number of fiscal and
monetary policy options to be potentially applied to
the goal of economic growth.  Selective use of capital
controls, while helping improve the capital account,
in this scenario also enhances the macropolicy space
for the application of monetary and fiscal policy to
growth objectives.13 Prioritizing Economic Growth: Enhancing Macroeconomic Policy Choice
IX. The East Asian experience: strategic
frameworks for macropolicy
Today, Latin America and East Asia again seem
to be juxtaposed in the minds of many as examples
of failure and success, similar to the great debate
over the reasons for the success of the ￿East Asian
Miracles￿ in the 1980s and 1990s. Now, Latin
America is looking back on a period of twenty years
of economic policy reform and re-democratization
and finding the economic and social benefits of these
reforms to be wanting. Economic growth has been
slower than anticipated; unemployment continues to
be high; and poverty reduction has not improved at
the rate hoped for. Several studies have concluded that
the reforms associated with the market liberalizing
agenda of the Washington Consensus have not led to
sufficient economic growth nor to accelerated social
improvement (Ocampo, 2003; and Correa, 2000).
There have been several efforts by Latin Americans
and others to rethink development strategies for Latin
America to break the stall in progress perceived to
plague the region to this point (Kuczynski and
Williamson, eds., 2003; and Bradford Jr., 2004).
By contrast, East Asia seems to have rebounded
from the Asia financial crisis in the late 1990s and
be regaining the growth momentum that had distin-
guished its performance over the last three decades.
In this context, recalling how Latin America and East
Asia were presented as studies in contrast in the
1980s and early 1990s, it seems appropriate to in-
quire regarding the lessons that might be drawn from
the dynamic growth experience of East Asia that
might inform an effort to reformulate strategic think-
ing in the rest of the developing world.
The debate regarding the East Asian success
stories was one in which two stylized dichotomies
were pitched against each other. Latin America was
seen as undertaking inward-looking, price distorting,
interventionist, policies which made their economies
inefficient and slow growing. East Asia was seen as
implementing outward-oriented, liberalizing, market-
driven, export-led growth strategies. These contrast-
ing features were meant to explain the differences
between the two regions in terms of failure and suc-
cess.
Given this way the debate was structured, the
conventional wisdom tended to see macropolicies
as subservient to the exigencies of market liberali-
zation, especially trade liberalization. This meant that
the role of macropolicy was to maintain tight mon-
etary and fiscal discipline to keep inflation down to
enhance the country￿s competitiveness as it sought
to create an export-led growth path based on open-
ness to the world economy, domestic prices equalling
world prices, and a real exchange rate that would
not be over-valued. These in essence constituted what
came to be in 1989 the Washington Consensus. The
export-led growth strategy, from the mainstream
point of view, was based on the idea that growth
would be driven by external demand inducing ex-
port growth in countries with open economies and
sound macropolicies. Macropolicies had a second-
ary role in this formulation aimed primarily at
achieving price stability which in the context of a
trade liberalization effort would presumably make
the economy competitive and lead to growth through
exports. Economic growth followed from financial
stability rather than from a development strategy or
a macropolicy that gave priority to growth. Rather,
the priority was on economic integration with glo-
bal markets which would force an alignment of
domestic prices with world prices achieving com-
petitiveness. The force field, from this perspective,
was from outside inward.
Another way of seeing the same phenomenon
viewed the process as working from inside outward.
From this alternative perspective, deliberate devel-
opment strategies were designed to accelerate growth
through high investment-GDP shares channelled by
market forces and government guidance to high pro-
ductivity sectors (Rodrik, 1997, 1999; Bradford Jr.
and Chakwin, 1993; UNCTAD, 2002: 51￿85; and
UNCTAD, 2003: 57￿89). These sectors had the po-
tential to claim market share in world markets based
on a combination of actions, factors and policies
which made those sectors highly competitive. The
net result of this formulation was that the East Asian
success stories were seen as export-push rather than
as export-led regimes. The high performance of East
Asia was attributed to growth-led exports, with dy-
namic economic growth generating supply-driven
exports, rather than to export-led growth which de-
rived from openness to world demand (Bradford Jr.,
1994). The clincher in terms of evidence in this de-
bate seemed to be that East Asian export growth for
twenty years was several times the average growth
rate in world demand for exports which gives more
credence to the export-push notion of insertion into
world markets claiming market share over the open-
ness to world markets, demand induced export-led
growth idea.14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 37
 This rather extensive and extended debate over
East Asia does seem to leave the legacy of an active
role for policy in the process of accelerating eco-
nomic growth. It seems clear now in retrospect that
the stylized versions of East Asian success made
choices as between the market and the state, the pub-
lic or the private sector, hands-on or hands off
strategies unnecessarily dichotomous alternatives.
The East Asian success stories seemed to have had
variety in their content. The Republic of Korea had
a private sector driven by large corporations whereas
small and medium enterprises were dominant in Tai-
wan Province of China. Hong Kong (China) was
close to a laissez faire regime whereas Singapore
was characterized by a highly authoritarian and
dirigiste hand of government in the economy. There
really was no single economic model in East Asia.
Equally important the relationship between the
public and the private sector appears have been cata-
lytic, more in the nature of lose coordination and
even cooperation than coercive, directive or dichoto-
mous. Public policies were meant to follow the
market rather than replace it, enhance competitive-
ness rather than protect against it or subsidize it, and
create an enabling environment in which private
enterprise could not only be efficient but also dynamic.
These strategic characteristics of public-private sec-
tor relations facilitated an exceptional performance
in both economic growth and exports.
Macropolicy in East Asia was a part of the de-
velopment strategies of the region which were
steadfastly dedicated to dynamic growth, rapid struc-
tural change internally, and high export performance.
Monetary and fiscal discipline were maintained;
external debt levels were not large as a percentage
of the fast-growing GDP; and exchange rates did
not become overvalued. Macropolicy was agile,
highly responsive to shifts in the external context,
rather than locked into a policy path. But the clear
priority was on growth; financial stability was sub-
ordinate to the primacy of dynamism.
A key aspect seems to have been the connec-
tion between macropolicy and structural policy in
which the links between sectoral policies, trade and
macroeconomic growth contributed significantly to
economic dynamism. Heckscher-Ohlin theory of
trade suggests that there is a ladder of comparative
advantage in which countries find themselves
moving from natural-resource based production
(agriculture and mining) to labour intensive manu-
facturing, to capital intensive manufacturing to hu-
man capital intensive production, and services to
technology intensive industries. This ladder repre-
sents ascending rates of productivity growth as
countries move up the ladder. Shifts in the sectoral
composition of output drive rates of structural
change. Empirical evidence suggests that countries
with high export-GDP shares have high rates of struc-
tural change (Bradford Jr., 1994: table II, page 30
and pages 19￿20). As countries grow fast their work-
ers become both better paid and better educated
which means that sectors requiring higher skilled
labour tend to grow as capital accumulates and even-
tually replace sectors with lower skill requirements.
These internal shifts in production patterns result in
commensurate changes in the composition of trade.
The interaction of growth, structural change and
trade is one of the principle dynamics that drive the
high performance of the East Asian economies.
It seems fair to say in retrospect that the lead-
ership of the East Asian economies were more con-
cerned about the competitiveness of their economies
in the broadest sense than in the narrower issue of
the appropriate level of their exchange rate. One
might say they were more concerned about the real
effective exchange rate of their economies than the
value (real or nominal) of their exchange rate. This
means that they were concerned about the institu-
tional environment, the banking system, labour-
management relations, the business culture and
climate, rule of law and commercial codes as com-
ponents of competitiveness along with sound macro-
economic policy conditions. The East Asian view of
dynamic economic growth was holistic and inte-
grated not narrow and technical. Their economic
policies were embedded in a broad strategic frame-
work which was inclusive. Their view of competi-
tiveness went beyond ￿getting prices right￿ and
beyond getting policies right to a broad sweep of
institutional, behavioural and regulatory norms. The
strategic perspectives and choices were critical to
their success.
The East Asian experiences of highly dynamic
growth provide examples of how economic policy
can be integrated into a larger strategic framework
which includes structural policies, institutional di-
mensions and a catalytic role for government in
engaging, involving and facilitating private sector
participation in the growth strategy. In the East Asian
cases both the public and the private sector are
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competitiveness, accelerating economic growth and
insertion into the world economy. Macroeconomic
policy management was exemplary in East Asia but
macropolicy management by itself does not explain
the high economic performance. The effectiveness
of macropolicy in East Asia resulted from its being
a part of a larger strategic framework that mar-
shalled other dimensions and assets to achieve
exceptional growth, generating higher yields from
sound macropolicies. The East Asian experience
provides useful insights into how to take full advan-
tage of enhanced macroeconomic policy choice to
generate major impacts on economic growth, em-
ployment and poverty reduction.
X. Conclusions: the logic of enhanced
macropolicy space and its
implications
This paper has spelled out the logic for increas-
ing policy space for the conduct of macroeconomic
policy for the purpose of prioritizing real economy
goals of growth, employment creation and poverty
reduction. The logic has proceeded in several steps.
First, there is the need to create more policy instru-
ments so that a greater number of policy goals can
be addressed. Frequently, real economy goals get
crowded out by financial objectives in part because
often there are too few instruments for too many
goals. The heterodox policy experience of several
developing countries has yielded additional arenas
for policy action as well as more policy tools which
help alleviate the crowding out problem.
Second, there is a need to avoid extreme all-
or-nothing policy choices which have the effect of
reducing the number of policy instruments available
as well as the effect of assigning the remaining policy
instruments to the more urgent goals. Financial and
external crises tend to trump in this situation. Here
the calibrated use of policy tools by degrees of com-
mitment, deployment and assignment can create
space for mixes of policies. This enhanced policy
space yields a wider range for different combina-
tions of policies which replace dichotomous choices
between extreme ￿corner solutions￿ such as open
versus closed capital accounts, fixed versus flexible
exchange rate regimes, autonomous versus foregone
monetary policy discretion, as embodied in the
trilemma. Selective capital controls, intermediate
exchange rate regimes, and some monetary policy
autonomy create the policy space within which a
variety of policy combinations and mixes are possi-
ble and a greater number of instruments are available
for assignment to policy goals. Prioritization of real
economy goals becomes both more feasible and more
likely with a broader range of policy alternatives.
Third, along with the selective use of capital
controls, fiscal policy-based stabilization instead of
exchange rate-based stabilization delinks the ex-
change rate from the goal of internal financial
stability to which it is yoked in a fixed rate regime.
This delinkage enables the use of intermediate ex-
change rate regimes (soft pegs and managed floats).
The use of these regimes in ￿the missing middle￿
create policy space where different mixes are possi-
ble generating a greater range of policy alternatives.
With fiscal policy assigned to internal balance, the
exchange rate can be assigned to the current account
and selective capital controls to the capital account.
Under this configuration (see chart 3) monetary
policy is loosened up from its rigid linkage to the
exchange rate by fiscal discipline strengthening the
exchange rate. With this combination of fiscal dis-
cipline, some capital controls and an intermediate
exchange rate regime, monetary policy can then be
assigned to economic growth. The degree to which
monetary policy can be assigned to growth is but-
tressed by the degree to which the other macropolicy
tools are used to achieve internal and external balance.
Monetary policy has the advantage of an instrument
for growth that is able to be flexibly managed.
Fourth, prioritizing real economy goals is also
facilitated by the design of a larger strategic frame-
work for accelerated development which includes
institutions, norms, behaviours and governance. The
larger strategic framework mobilizes more assets and
power toward a dynamic growth trajectory which
creates a more favourable context for macroeco-
nomic policy. The growth, employment and poverty
reduction outcomes from macropolicy are likely to
be larger when they are part of a wider effort to
marshal resources for accelerated development. The
examples of the East Asian success stories provide
the evidence for this conclusion.
These four steps in the logic for increased
macroeconomic policy choice provide reasons to
believe that there is indeed room for macropolicies
for growth even in the face of considerable theoreti-
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deflationary biases in macropolicy-making. These
four innovations ￿ new policy tools, selective prag-
matism, fiscal policy-based stability, and strategic
framework ￿ reinforce each other in their capacity
to create more policy space. To the extent that ef-
forts are made on all four fronts simultaneously the
greater the flexibility and choice open to publics and
policy makers in forging macropolicies appropriate
to national contexts and current circumstances. With
a greater range of policy choice, economic policy
would be able to contribute to the strengthening of
democratic process by engaging public institutions
and policy makers in open debate on alternative
policy paths rather than isolating economic policy-
making from public discussion due to the sense of
lack of options.
Furthermore, enhanced policy space and alter-
natives would be expected to enrich and enliven the
international debate about the policy prescriptions,
conditionality and development strategies of the in-
ternational financial institutions as they seek to
support development. The broader array of policy
alternatives might be expected to bring more diverse
perspectives from different country experiences to
the international discussion of policies of the inter-
national institutions. There is more reason to have
stronger mechanisms for global economic govern-
ance and better representation from diverse countries
if there are fresh viewpoints and a wider range of
views on effective combinations of policies. There-
fore, the extent to which there can be greater degrees
of choice in macropolicy-making is a key foundational
idea for creating a more representative and a more
meaningful system of global economic governance.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the
feasible enhancement of macropolicy choice
strengthens national policy as the primary nexus for
decisions on national priorities and on the trade-off
between economic growth and stability. Against the
background of the pattern of global imbalances
rooted in domestic macropolicy imbalances over
the last thirty years, national governments have a
strengthened hand as the principal mediator between
the global economy and national economies with
increased policy space. The supposed erosion of
national autonomy due to globalization encounters
countervailing forces as countries are able to suc-
cessfully design pro-growth policy paths due to en-
hanced macroeconomic policy choice. National
decision-making is still the locus of governance in
economic policy, even in an era of globalization. The
nation-state as the nexus point for macropolicy
choice is another foundational idea of global eco-
nomic governance.8
Notes
1 The equalization of returns in all markets in an integrated
world economy composed of open economies follows
the principle of interest parity which with capital mobil-
ity requires that the combination of interest rate differ-
entials between two markets and the difference between
their expected and actual nominal exchange rate must
be equal. This means in effect that interest rate shifts in
one market require an off-setting exchange rate adjust-
ment, and conversely, an exchange rate shift originating
in one market requires an offsetting monetary policy (in-
terest rate) shift in the other market. Otherwise, differ-
ential returns between the two markets will lead to dis-
proportionate flows out of one toward the other.
2 A similar argument is made in Frankel (2003, especially
pages 17￿19). I am indebted to Susan Collins for this
reference.
3 The emphasis in this section on ￿rational pragmatism￿
and ￿the pragmatic middle￿ is in the same spirit as
Bryant￿s superb treatment of cross-border finance in his
section on ￿A Middle Way: Steadfast Eclecticism￿ in
chapter 12, pages 386￿389, and elsewhere in Bryant
(2003).
4 For an articulation of fiscal-based exchange rate
stabilization, see Bradford Jr. (1999: 54￿56). See also
UNCTAD (2003, especially pages 137￿138).
5 From Fischer (2001: figures 1, 2 and 3; and tables 1, 2
and 3), there are 28 countries with managed float re-
gimes at the end of 1999 which together with 63 coun-
tries with ￿intermediate￿ exchange rate regimes (￿soft￿
pegs of some sort) constitute a group of 91 countries out
of a total of 186 countries. Within the framework being
developed here, managed float regimes are ￿intermedi-
ate￿ regimes rather than in the same category with ￿in-
dependent float￿ regimes, as in Fischer (2001).
6 See especially section II, ￿Measures of Capital Account
Restrictions￿, Edison et al. (2002: 4￿19).
7 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER), annual issues 1997 through 2003. See ￿Sum-
mary Features￿ tables in each volume, and also the pref-
ace and introduction to the 1997 AREAR establishing
the new tabular format.
8 Bryant (2003: 390￿398) makes very similar points in his
chapter on ￿The Evolution of International Financial
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